关键词: 乡村治理, 村干部, 委托代理, 基层治理

Abstract:

The state achieves rural governance through village cadres as agents. Studies have shown that the single principal-agent relationship has caused goal deviation, the formation of agent interests, corruption, etc. The case of Anji County shows that, by applying consistent goals, connecting higher-level policy intentions and rural needs, combining 'hard assessment' and 'soft incentives', and integrating organizational management and village supervision, village cadres can take, and initiate, action. They are able to avoid the various drawbacks that may arise from one-way agency or the imbalance of dual agency. This can lead to positive interactions between the state and rural areas that improve the efficiency of rural governance. The premise of balancing the dual agency role is based on the consistency of national and rural goals. The key to achieving that is to form a two-way incentive-and-constraint relationship between the nation and the rural village cadres. Balancing the dual agency role also helps to promote a coupling relationship between the state and rural areas, which in turn provides guarantees for balancing the dual agency role.

Key words: rural governance, village cadres, dual agency