Abstract:

The behavior of grassroots policy implementation is an essential issue in the study of grassroots governance in China. Based on the logical chain of the organizational tension-behavioral game-implementation effect, this paper summarizes the “strategic interaction of grassroots cadres in different levels of grassroots government” framework to analyze the case of A town’s implementation of the Rural Living Environment Upgrade policy in S Province. By tracking the implementation process, grassroots cadres can be seen taking the initiative to claim work tasks, improving policy standards, shortening the implementation period, and responding to the added-workload of the superior government. However, while these grassroots policy executors were implementing the policy, they also delayed implementation and suspended policies, among other behaviors. Grassroots governance through township governments, which is largely dominated by bureaucracy, is often loosely coupled. Multiple organizational tensions, including power-responsibility imbalances, incentive deviations, mobilization disparities, and emotional alienation, give rise to an interplay in which grassroots cadres at different levels within the township government engage in a game of “added-workload” and “deducted-workload”. This back and forth significantly impacts the outcomes of policy implementation.

Key words: grassroots policy implementation, grassroots strategic interaction, loosely-coupled relationship, rural living environment upgrade