Abstract:

Top-Down Escalation’s (ceng ceng jia ma) prominence in China’s local governance has attracted significant attention in both theoretical and practical circles. What is little discussed, however, is the generation, and the variety, of Top-Down Escalation mechanisms in multi-level governance systems. An intriguing question is the differentiation among escalation behaviors. Why do some policies trigger “Top-Down Escalation” but others do not? Is this merely the result of China’s Pressurized System combined with its well-known Political Tournaments and Intergovernmental Collusion? This paper develops a structure-resource-agency triadic framework to analyze the hierarchical transformation dynamics and differentiated patterns of escalation behaviors. Our findings show that, in a multi-level governance system, the intermediate government, situated between superior and subordinate levels, determines the intensity of pressure transmission and the threshold for escalation. This is meant to directly influence the behavioral adjustments of the lower level governments, leading to the accumulation or termination of escalation. Given these dynamics, any improvements in the operation of multi-level governance systems should begin with a focus on the influence wielded by the intermediate government levels.

Key words: top-down escalation, agency, intermediate government, governance resource allocation, multi-level structure