Abstract:

Controllingthe market power of large platforms through a gatekeeper system has become a realistic choice for some countries. Yet the theoretical controversies surrounding the system continue. Extra-territorial studies show that the gatekeeper system tends to be static in form and inefficient in substance. The innovative advantages of the macro-paradigm have failed to fully cover the imbalance in the construction of the rules. And it is difficult to speak of a direct reference to such an intentional preference in legislative intent and normative expression. Whether and how to establish a gatekeeper system in China depends fundamentally on the local environment. Although the discrepancy between regulatory demand and legal supply justifies the creation of the gatekeeper system, it is still necessary to reshape the positioning of the system to achieve integration and balance in the social and the economic spheres that also simultaneously provides certainty and flexibility. Accordingly, China’s gatekeeper system should maintain a basic respect for market facts and juridical logic. With one hand, it should promote a rational construction of legislative texts, with a focus on establishing subject identification rules based on“ecosystem control” and an obligation system combining “principles+rules+exceptions”.But the other hand should facilitate a diversified configuration of practical mechanisms, explore a system operation path oriented in participatory law enforcement and authoritative justice, and help the formation and improvement of an independent knowledge system for Chinese platform competition rule of law that effectively regulates large platforms.

Key words: gatekeeper system, large-scale platform, competition governance, platform regulation, indigenization