Abstract:

The formation logic of environmental supervision by the central government includes restoring the environmental governance mechanisms and strengthening the environmental accountability system. The center provides mobilization pressure through its environmental supervision system and relies on social coordination and public participation. Accountability pressure is generated under the organizational structure of the central environmental protection supervision system which relies on party committee leadership and government responsibility. This is not sustainable under a rule-of-law system. The disadvantages and difficulties include excessive dependence on administrative power, the absence of a long-term mechanism, and weak multi-governance. Through organization of self-organization and governance of governance, meta-governance advocates for the dependence and cooperation of multiple governance subjects, emphasizes the dominant position of the state, and retains the influence of the government. This is in line with the governance logic of party committee leadership, government responsibility, social coordination, and the public participation practiced by the central environmental supervision system. It provides a reference direction for rule-of-law process as it is optimized in the environmental inspection system, the reconstruction of government's role, and the coordination of governance modes.

Key words: Meta-governance, environmental governance, central environmental protection supervision, government role, governance responsibility