Abstract:

The contemporary global governance architecture is undergoing profound transformation. The diversification of governance actors, with multinational corporations and other non-state entities emerging as significant participants, has been accompanied by the increasing fragmentation of governance mechanisms. The rapid iteration of digital technologies such as artificial intelligence not only furnishes new modalities of regulatory capacity but also engenders unprecedented risks and systemic challenges. The so-called “Brussels Effect,” centered on the unilateral export of the EU’s stringent regulatory standards, has secured for the EU a distinct position of normative and regulatory advantage within the realm of global governance. Based on a political, economic, and social indicator framework, a dialectical analysis from a cost-benefit perspective reveals that the negative aspects of the Brussels Effect significantly outweigh its positive value. At the corporate level, escalating compliance expenditures surpass the dividends of market access; at the national level, particularly for low-income states, the legislative adaptation and institutional restructuring costs are prohibitively high, thereby aggravating distributive inequalities within the global regulatory order. Accordingly, the Brussels Effect cannot be regarded as a viable paradigm for governance emulation, especially for developing states. Against this backdrop, China should reaffirm the core principle of multilateralism, actively construct universally beneficial and inclusive cooperative mechanisms, and improve the legal safeguards for steadily expanding institutional opening-up. Meanwhile, enterprises should strengthen their compliance awareness while leveraging both domestic and international markets, so as to jointly promote the equitable provision of global public goods.

Key words: brussels effect, global governance, cost-benefit analysis, global governance initiative, institutional opening-up