Abstract:

China's reform has always been accompanied by large-scale pilot policies. For those pilot programs that had no diffusion effect， local governments would not stop them. As a result， these pilot programs go around in circles， forming a unique phenomenon of pilot suspension. This study proposes an explanatory framework that pilot suspension is the product of the combined effects of local reformers' demands for political promotion， the self-weakening effect of pilot feedback， the restraining effect of inter-governmental learning， and the legitimacy of pilot decisions. Pilot suspension consumes administrative resources， and valuable knowledge production is stagnant， which does not help to improve perceptions of uncertainty. To improve the effectiveness of pilot-driven knowledge production， we should not only provide balanced incentive arrangements to stimulate innovation by local governments， but also improve pilot trial designs and evaluation modes， put forward framework goals， set time-limit requirements， and establish reporting， peer review， and reputation incentive systems.

Key words: pilot Suspension, uncertainty, policy feedback, peers Review, property tax pilot